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John Broome’s widely discussed philosophical theory of rationality and reasoning is
strikingly different from ordinary rational choice theory.2 Firstly, it focuses on psycho-
logy and mental states —against the behaviourist revealed-preference tradition, but
in line with the recent trend towards ‘behavioural economics’which takes psychology
more seriously.3 Secondly, it explicitly addresses the process of reasoning by which
mental states change, the blind spot of choice theory. Thirdly, it is largely informal,
which explains why choice theory has so far managed to ignore it, despite its strong
interest to philosophers.4
1We thank John Broome for extensive feedback. We also thank an anonymous referee for valuable
advice. This paper was presented widely, for instance in the seminar Decision, Rationality, Interaction
in Paris, France (May 2018), the Philosophy Seminar at University of Milano, Italy (May, 2018), the
Economics and Philosophy Congress ‘Norms and Normativity’, Lyon, France (June 2018), the confer-
ence Algebraic Proof Theory For Social Behaviour at Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands
(July 2018), and the Economics Seminar at Glasgow University, Adam Smith Business School, U.K.
(October 2018). We thank the audiences for their comments. Franz Dietrich acknowledges support
by the French National Research Agency through the grants “Coping With Heterogeneous Opin-
ions”(ANR-17-CE26-0003) and “Collective Attitude Formation”(ANR-16-FRAL-0010) and through
an EUR grant.
2John Broome, “Wide or Narrow Scope?,”Mind, CXVI, 462 (April 2007): 360—70; and John
Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
3The debate between behaviourism and mentalism is ongoing; see especially, Daniel Hausman,
(ed.), The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology, 3rd. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007); Daniel Hausman, Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2012); Franz Dietrich and Christian List, “Mentalism versus Behaviourism in Econom-
ics: A Philosophy-of-science Perspective,”Economics and Philosophy, XXXII, 2 (July 2016): 249—81;
and Samir Okasha, “On the Interpretation of Decision Theory,”Economics and Philosophy, XXXII,
3 (November 2016): 409—33.
4See, for example, Derek Parfit and John Broome, “Reasons and Motivation,”Proceedings of the
Aristotelian society, supplementary volumes, LXXI (January 1997): 99—146; Niko Kolodny, “Why Be
Rational?,”Mind, CXIV, 455 (July 2005): 509—63; Niko Kolodny, “State or Process Requirements?,”
Mind, CXVI, 462 (April 2007): 371—85; Crispin Wright, “Comment on Paul Boghossian, “What
is Inference”,”Philosophical Studies, CLXIX, 1 (May 2014): 27—37; Paul Boghossian, “Rationality,
Reasoning and Rules: Reflections on Broome’s Rationality through Reasoning,”Philosophical Studies,
CLXXIII, 12 (December 2016): 3385—397; Garrett Cullity, “Describing Rationality,” Philosophical
Studies, CLXXIII, 12 (December 2016): 3399—411; Philip Pettit, “Broome on Reasoning and Rule-
following,”Philosophical Studies, CLXXIII, 12 (December 2016): 3373—84; and Nicholas Southwood,
“The Motivation Question,”Philosophical Studies, CLXXIII, 12 (December 2016): 3413—30.
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In this paper, we formalize Broome’s framework, in the hope to open it towards
choice theorists, behavioural economists, and logicians; and we present sharp results
about Broome’s central question of whether we can become more rational through
reasoning. First though we should give some context.
Broome understands rationality as a static concept, and reasoning as a dynamic
concept. The rationality of a human agent (‘you’ in his language) is taken to con-
sist in ‘order’or ‘coherence’in your mind.5 You are rational if your current mental
states or attitudes — your beliefs, preferences, intentions, and so on — cohere with
one another. This understanding of rationality corresponds with what many others
would call ‘formal’as opposed to ‘substantive’ rationality. Reasoning, by contrast,
is regarded as a rule-governed mental process of forming new attitudes from existing
ones, through consciously operating on the contents of your attitudes. Reasoning is
seen as a mental ‘act’, as opposed to other causal psychological processes which are
automatic and subpersonal.
To what extent can you become rational through active reasoning? This is Broome’s
central question. The question poses a problem for those “who write on rationality
[and] seem to think that they have finished their job when they have described re-
quirements of rationality”.6 Why do many people, including choice theorists and
philosophers, think describing rationality is enough? Broome suggests —and we agree
— that they take for granted that rationality is achievable through reasoning: they
“must believe that, starting from knowledge of a particular requirement, you can
reason your way actively to satisfying that requirement”.7 So they simply presuppose
a positive answer to Broome’s open question.
Broome’s question is of existential importance for choice theory and behavioural
social sciences. In choice theory, rationality is usually formulated in terms of axioms
that impose restrictions on preferences and beliefs.8 But choice theorists rarely ask
how you come to satisfy these axioms.9 When choice theory is interpreted descript-
ively, there seems to be an implicit assumption that if agents conform to the axioms,
then this conformity is not in need of psychological explanation. But that cannot be
right: if rationality is in fact a systematic property of agents, there must be some
process of mental operations by which rationality is brought about. When choice the-
ory is interpreted normatively, the principle of ‘ought implies can’seems to commit
5Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (op. cit.), p.152.
6Broome (ibid.), p. 208.
7Broome (ibid.), pp. 208—9.
8Choice theorists use attitudes such as preferences and beliefs to explain observed choice behaviour.
They work not only with axioms on attitudes (such as transitivity), but sometimes also with axioms
on choice behaviour itself (such as contraction constituency). We here focus on axioms on attitudes.
Choice theorists usually treat some attitudes as effectively observable (typically preferences) and
others as more remote and possibly behaviourally underdetermined (e.g., beliefs in some models of
choice under uncertainty).
9Lewis’s theory of common knowledge is an important exception; see David Lewis, Convention: A
Philosophical Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969). In contrast to what is now standard
practice in game theory, his analysis treats players’common knowledge as a product of specific modes
of reasoning. See in particular Robin Cubitt and Robert Sugden, “Common Knowledge, Salience and
Convention: A Reconstruction of David Lewis’s Game Theory,”Economics and Philosophy, XIX, 2
(October 2003): 175—210.
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theorists to assuming that rationality is achievable, presumably through reasoning.10
Broome’s question is also crucial for behavioural social sciences. Behavioural re-
search is discovering many systematic patterns in real choices that violate rationality
axioms of choice theory. Many of these patterns can be classified as context-dependent
choice reversals. The same person, facing (what can plausibly be described as) the
same two options in different choice contexts, systematically chooses one option in one
context and the other in the other. A common explanatory strategy is to attribute
these reversals to ‘reasoning errors’or ‘absence of reasoning’. Such claims are increas-
ingly being used to justify public policies such as ‘nudging’that manipulate contextual
features of decision environments with the aim of helping individuals avoid reasoning
errors.11 Many explanations of context-dependent choice effectively assume the exist-
ence of stable preferences defined on some domain, and then invoke context-dependent
psychological mechanisms (such the use of rules of thumb, changing perceptions, or
lack of self-control) which interpose between those preferences and choice.12 These
theories again implicitly presuppose that reasoning can in principle achieve rationality.
Despite all this, Broome’s theory has so far had little impact on social science.
This comes not only from its informal nature, but perhaps also from Broome’s parallel
pursuit of two orthogonal lines of investigation: a ‘structural’ investigation into the
concepts of requirements and reasoning, and an (often only tentative) investigation
into what precisely is rationally required and when reasoning is intuitively ‘correct’.
Both dimensions are important, but should be disentangled and addressed separately,
we believe.
In this paper, we address the structural dimension of Broome’s programme. We
formalize the central features of Broome’s approach, including ‘requirements of ration-
ality’, ‘theories of rationality’, and ‘reasoning rules’for rational choice, while setting
aside substantive questions of which theory and reasoning rules are ‘correct’. Our
model differs from ordinary rational-choice models through focusing on psychology
and through modelling the reasoning process, including theoretical reasoning (reason-
ing with beliefs) and practical reasoning (reasoning towards intentions). In line with
Broome and rational choice theory, we shall use the term ‘rational’to mean ‘formally
10 In his canonical statement of rational-choice theory, Leonard Savage says that the main use he
would make of its rationality axioms ‘is normative, to police my own decision for consistency and,
where possible, to make complicated decisions to depend on simpler ones’. See Leonard J. Savage, The
Foundations of Statistics (New York: Wiley, 1954). This concept of ‘policing’seems to presuppose
that reasoning can in principle achieve rationality.
11See in particular Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health,
Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008).
12See, for example, Thaler and Sunstein (ibid.), pp. 40—1; Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti,
“Categorize then Choose: Boundedly Rational Choice and Welfare, ” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association, X, 5 (October 2012): 1141—65; Franz Dietrich and Christian List, “Reason-based
Choice and Context-dependence: An Explanatory Framework,”Economics and Philosophy, XXXII,
2 (July 2016): 175—229; and Franz Dietrich and Christian List, “What Matters and How it Matters: A
Choice-theoretic Representation of Moral Theories,”Philosophical Review, CXXVI, 4 (October 2017):
421—79. See also Gerardo Infante, Guilhem Lecouteux, and Robert Sugden, “Preference Purification
and the Inner Rational Agent: A Critique of the Conventional Wisdom of Behavioural Welfare Eco-
nomics,” Journal of Economic Methodology, XXIII, 1 (January 2016): 1—25. In this paper, Infante,




Psychologists and thereafter behavioural social scientists have often classified men-
tal processes into two systems: the fast and automatic ‘System 1’which generates im-
pressions, intuitions, feelings, and impulses, and the slow, conscious, and deliberative
‘System 2’which, operating on the outputs of System 1, constructs explicit thoughts
in an orderly way.13 Behavioural economists often presuppose without question that
System 2 is able to create fully rational preferences and beliefs, and surprisingly do
not explicitly describe the reasoning process by which this is supposed to happen.14
Our Broomean model can be regarded as an explicit description of the reasoning
underlying System 2.
Within our model, we derive sharp results about whether specific types of ration-
ality requirements can or cannot be achieved through reasoning. As it turns out, some
common types of requirement can be achieved by reasoning, but others can not. Our
negative results cast doubts on the mentioned idea that System 2 is able to achieve
full rationality. Using a simple version of conventional choice theory as our leading
example, we discuss how far our negative results reveal deficiencies in received ideas
about rationality, and or gaps in Broome’s theory.
1 Key features of Broome’s structural theory
Let us give some background that will guide our model. Broome fundamentally dis-
tinguishes between ‘rationality’and ‘reasoning’. Rationality is understood as one of
many possible sources of requirements on your mental states. Other sources of require-
ments might be morality, prudence, fashion, or Catholicism.15 Broome leaves open
whether rationality is normative, that is, generates normative ‘oughts’.16 A distinct-
ive feature of rationality is that it requires coherence between mental states: “your
mental states [are] properly related to each other”.17 Broome is primarily concerned
with synchronic requirements: requirements on mental states held simultaneously. He
takes ordinary rationality requirements to have wide scope: for example, for Broome
an enkrasia requirement takes the form “Rationality requires of you that if you believe
you ought to do F then you intend to do F”, rather than “If you believe you ought to
do F, rationality requires of you that you intend to do F” in which the requirement
has a narrow scope.18 Our model is thus designed to represent wide-scope synchronic
requirements. Broome’s contention that ordinary rationality requirements have wide
scope has been questioned, in particular by Kolodny;19 we need not take a position in
this debate. It is however uncontroversial that the principal rationality requirements
found in choice theory are both synchronic and wide-scope, which establishes (at least)
13See Peter C. Wason and Jonathan B. Evans, “Dual processes in reasoning?,”Cognition, III, 2
(January: 1974): 141—54; and Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 2011), pp. 19-30.
14See Infante et al., “Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent”(op. cit.), for a docu-
mentation of this claim.
15Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (op. cit.), pp. 26, 116.
16Broome (ibid.), p. 146.
17Broome (ibid.), p. 152.
18Broome (ibid.), pp. 31—2.
19Kolodny in “Why Be Rational?”(op. cit.) and “State or Process Requirements?”(op. cit.).
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the relevance of Broome’s notion of rationality and our model thereof.
Unconventionally, Broomean reasoning is reasoning with multiple attitudes. This
goes beyond reasoning with beliefs (‘theoretical reasoning’) and reasoning towards
intentions (‘practical reasoning’), although Broome gives special importance to these
two classic types of reasoning.20 Broome describes reasoning as “a rule-governed
operation on the contents of your conscious attitudes”;21 as a causal psychological
process through which “some of your attitudes cause you to acquire a new attitude”;22
and as a conscious activity under your control, to be distinguished from automatic
psychological processes which also affect attitudes. Structurally, a mental state or
attitude is given by (i) its content, a proposition, and (ii) the type of attitude held
towards that content, for example belief or intention.23 Your mental experience of
reasoning consists in bringing to mind a set of premise-attitudes and then finding (in
a way that can be expressed as ‘So. . . ’) that some conclusion-attitude follows from
them. The sense of ‘following from’is that of (implicitly or explicitly) being guided
by some rule, in a way that “seems right to you”; whether that rule is correct in
some external sense is beside the point.24 Crucially, reasoning is an operation on the
contents of your attitudes: you bring to your consciousness the contents of attitudes
(for example, that it rains, or that you take an umbrella), not the attitudes towards
these contents (for example, that you believe that it rains, or intend that you take
an umbrella). Nonetheless, the attitudes held towards contents do not get lost in
reasoning: they determine ‘how’you consciously entertain the contents (as beliefs?
as intentions? and so on), the exact meaning of which belongs to the philosophically
trickiest elements of Broome’s theory.
Broome distinguishes higher-order from first-order attitudes; the former are at-
titudes towards propositions about your own attitudes, such as your intention that
you believe something.25 He treats reasoning with first-order attitudes as the fun-
damental kind of reasoning, insisting that “higher-order beliefs are not necessary for
reasoning”.26 Thus, for example, a child can carry out modus ponens reasoning on
the contents of his beliefs without any awareness of having beliefs, indeed without any
concept of ‘belief’.27 Although our model does not rule out higher-order attitudes,
our applications concentrate on first-order attitudes.
Against this background, we now present our Broomean model.
2 Mental states formalized
An agent has many mental states, like beliefs, intentions, or preferences. A mental
state is an attitude towards something (the ‘object’or ‘content’of that attitude). An
example is the belief that it rains: the attitude is belief, the content is that it rains.
20Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (op. cit.), p. 250.
21Broome (ibid.), p. 234.
22Broome (ibid.), p. 225.
23Broome (ibid.), pp. 251—2.
24Broome (ibid.), pp. 237—8.
25Broome (ibid.), p. 236.
26Broome (ibid.), p. 236.
27Broome (ibid.), p. 229.
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Another example is the intention that I swim: the attitude is intention, the content
is that I swim.
Each attitude has (i) a number of places and (ii) a domain. We explain both
in turn. Belief and intention are one-place attitudes: their object is a single thing.
Preference is a two-place attitude, since something is being preferred to something
else. A mental state with a one-place attitude is represented by an object-attitude
pair (p, a), for example (I swim, intention). In general, a state with an n-place
attitude is represented by a tuple (p1, ..., pn, a) where a is the attitude and (p1, ..., pn)
its n-ary object. For example, (I swim, I eat, preference) represents preference of
swimming over eating. We use the term ‘object’of attitudes in two ways: the state
(p1, ..., pn, a) is said to have n objects p1, ..., pn, or to have just one object (p1, ..., pn).
Both usages are equivalent for one-place attitudes.
The domain of an attitude is its set of possible objects: the belief domain contains
whatever can be believed, the intention domain contains whatever can be intended,
the preference domain contains the things between which preferences can be held, and
so on. Some might claim that any attitude can be held towards anything: you can
believe anything, intend anything, and so on. Others might insist that you can intend
only things you can bring about.
Formally, our model has two primitives:
• a fixed non-empty set L of objects. Philosophers might think of them as propos-
itions, choice-theorists as options, events, or other things. More on this soon.
• a fixed non-empty set A of attitudes or more exactly types of attitudes, each
coming with a domain D ⊆ L of possible objects and a number of places n
in {1, 2, . . .}. A might contain one-place attitudes of belief bel and intention
int and a two-place preference attitude , each with some domain of possible
objects. Some or all attitudes might have universal domain of applicability D =
L. Choice-theoretic models (when recast in our framework) typically involve
attitudes with restricted domains: in game theory, players hold preferences w.r.t.
final outcomes (or outcome lotteries), intentions w.r.t. own actions, and beliefs
w.r.t. actions of opponents.
Definition 1 A (mental) state or attitude is a tuple (p1, ..., pn, a) — called the
‘attitude of type a towards p1, ..., pn’ — where a is an attitude type in A, n is its
number of places, and p1, ..., pn belong to its domain. Let M be the set of all mental
states.
Note that we say ‘attitude’both for ‘mental states’in M and ‘attitude types’in
A. No ambiguity will arise. Mental states whose attitude type is belief (intention,
preference, ...) are called belief states (intention states, preference states, ...), or
simply beliefs (intentions, preferences, ...).
We call the totality of an agent’s mental states at a given time his current ‘consti-
tution’:
Definition 2 A (mental) constitution is a set C ⊆M of mental states; it contains
the mental states held by the agent.
We shall often interpret objects in L as propositions. One might indeed argue
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that all attitudes are held fundamentally towards propositions: that desiring apples
ultimately means desiring that one eats apples, that intending to swim ultimately
means intending that one swims, and so on. But one may alternatively take L to
consist of sentences, properties, actions, events, states of affairs, or even a mixture of
things such as actions (the domain of intention) and events (the domain of belief).
Choice theorists, by contrast, might interpret objects in L as choice options, goods,
Savage acts, nature events, strategies, or a mixture thereof.
We now give a philosophical or logical application, followed by a choice-theoretic
application.
Application 1: agent-internal language for practical reasoning. Following
Broome, think of L as containing all propositions relevant to practical reasoning, such
as it rains or I take an umbrella. Let A contain at least the one-place attitudes of
belief bel and intention int, the two central attitudes in Broome’s analysis of practical
reasoning. Your constitution might contain mental states such as (it rains, bel), (I
stay dry, int), (carrying an umbrella is a means implied by staying dry, bel), and
(I carry an umbrella, int).
Following Broome, one might not formalize L: one might let L be an abstract set
of primitive objects called ‘propositions’.28 But if one needs a model of propositions
—to capture their logical relations and combine them through operations like ‘and’—
then one can go one of two possible ways, which we shall sketch without giving precise
definitions.29 A set-theoretic or extensional model of propositions lets propositions
be sets of possible worlds; so L contains subsets of a given set of possible worlds.
A syntactic or intensional model of propositions lets propositions be sentences; so L
contains the sentences of a suitable formal language. This is not to claim that sets
of worlds or sentences metaphysically ‘are’ the contents of attitudes, but that they
can formally ‘represent’these contents. The intensional model is more Broomean in
our view: Broome needs an intensional notion of proposition, as agents might believe
(intend, ...) some proposition without believing (intending, ...) an equivalent one.
Application 2: choice under certainty. It is easy to recast the classic choice-
theoretic model of choice under certainty within our Broomean model. Instead of
recasting the classic model as such, we choose a slightly revisionary representation of
choice under certainty, which strikes us as being more mentalistic, that is, closer to the
actual psychology of (conscious and deliberate) choice. We shall indicate where our
representation is revisionary, and how a classical representation would have worked.
Consider a fixed non-empty set X of mutually exclusive choice options, such as goods
or political candidates. The agent has attitudes of preference and indifference towards
options. In each choice context, certain options from X are feasible; they form the
feasible set, formally a non-empty subset Y ⊆ X from which the agent chooses one
element. Choice theory implicitly assumes the feasible set to be known. Our men-
talistic model rather takes the agent to have beliefs about what the feasible set is;
28Broome (ibid.), pp. 251, 260—1.
29For details, see Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras, and Robert Sugden, “Bey-
ond Belief: Logic in Multiple Attitudes,” working paper (March 2019), available at
www.franzdietrich.net/Papers/DietrichStarasSugden-BeyondBelief.pdf
7
the model is silent about whether those beliefs are correct. Following Broome, acts of
choice are not mental states, but non-mental occurrences caused by particular mental
states, namely intentions. So our model contains not acts, but intentions as their
mental counterparts. Overall, as objects of attitudes we need:
• options x in X, the objects of intention, preference, and indifference,
• feasible sets Y in 2X\{∅}, the objects of feasibility beliefs.
Formally, L = X ∪ (2X\{∅}). Whoever wants attitudes to have propositional content
can re-interpret an x as the proposition that x is chosen, and a Y as the proposition
that Y is the feasible set.
Next, let A = {int, bel,,∼}, where:
• int is a one-place attitude with domain X; (x, int) represents intention to choose
x;
•  and ∼ are two-place attitudes with domain X; (x, y,) represents (strict)
preference of x to y, (x, y,∼) represents indifference between x and y;
• bel is a one-place attitude with domain 2X\{∅}; (Y, bel) represents belief that
the feasible set is Y .
Aside from differences in formalism, this model departs in three substantive ways
from classical choice theory (and these differences will later allow for a richer spectrum
of interesting rationality requirements):
Departure 1: We work with two attitudes  and∼, although choice theorists usually
start from a single relation of weak preference rather than two relations of strict
preference and indifference. We could have used a single weak-preference atti-
tude % and defined A as {int, bel,%}. However, within our mentalist framework
we prefer working with  and ∼, because a weak-preference attitude % seems
artificial and composite in nature. Mentalistically, the weak preference relation
of choice theory is best interpreted as a mathematically convenient represent-
ation of the disjunction of two attitudes. Technically, the difference between
working with  and ∼ and working with % is small: using  and ∼ one can
express weak preference (as preference-or-indifference), and conversely, using %
one can express both strict preference (as weak preference without indifference)
and indifference (as weak preference in both directions). Nonetheless, working
with  and ∼ is more general, because it allows violation of three very basic
rationality assumptions, namely asymmetry of preference, symmetry of indiffer-
ence, and mutual exclusiveness between preference and indifference, defined in
R2-R4 below.
Departure 2: We model the agent’s feasibility beliefs, whereas choice theorists as-
sume that the feasible set is given and known. We could have followed the same
route as choice theory, by removing the attitude bel from A, and thus remov-
ing feasibility beliefs from constitutions, with an implicit assumption that the
feasible set Y is exogenously given and automatically known. But this would
suppress an important element of practical reasoning, and under-describe the
psychology of choice.
Departure 3: We take the agent to intend a single option, whereas choice theorists
work with a ‘choice correspondence’C that specifies for each possible feasible
set Y a (non-empty) set C(Y ) ⊆ Y of chosen options. A non-singleton choice
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set C(Y ) means that different choices are observed in different occurrences of
the same context Y . Such non-uniqueness is usually rationalized by indifference
between the options in C(Y ). Choice theorists do not ask how an agent arrives
at a specific choice if |C(Y )| ≥ 2; nor do they ask how agents break the tie in case
of indifference. By contrast, we care about the formation of intentions to choose,
given our mentalistic agenda. Again, we could have matched choice theory if we
had wanted to: we could have mimicked non-unique choice by re-defining the
object of intention int as being, not an option, but a non-empty set of options (a
‘coarse option’). Here, intending a set means intending that some of its members
be chosen (for example, intending {x, y} means intending ‘x or y’). Why do we
not do this? First, choice theorists would not usually explain non-unique choice
by lack of specific intention. Choice theorists are notoriously agnostic about
psychological matters, but, if forced to link choice to intentions, many would
explain a non-singleton choice set C(Y ) in terms of different possible (specific)
intentions, not one coarse intention. Second, although it might well happen that
we make a specific choice without specific intention —that we eat a red apple
while intending to eat some apple —such partially conscious action is not our
main focus. We focus on fully conscious agents. More on this topic in Section 7.
3 Requirements on mental states
We now formalize the notion of requirement, in its most standard sense aligned with
choice theory and endorsed by Broome (that is, the ‘synchronic’ and ‘wide-scope’
sense mentioned in Section 1). In our terminology, such requirements are restrictions
on your constitution. In this section, we define ‘requirements’generically, without yet
caring about whether they are imposed by rationality.
Since a requirement classifies constitutions into those satisfying and those violating
it, we identify each requirement with the set of constitutions satisfying it:
Definition 3 A requirement is a set R of constitutions; constitutions in R ‘satisfy’
the requirement, others ‘violate’it.
Among the numerous potential requirements (sets of constitutions), the tautolo-
gical requirement allows all constitutions (R = 2M ) and the contradictory one allows
no constitution (R = ∅).
We now give examples of requirements, more precisely requirement schemas since
the requirements involve parameters:
Examples of requirements within Application 1: Broome treats the following
properties, or versions thereof, as requirements of rationality:30
• Non-contradiction: you do not believe both p and not p, formally R = {C :
(p, bel) ∈ C)⇒ (not p, bel) 6∈ C}. Parameter: p ∈ L.
30Broome’s non-contradiction requirement is exactly ours; see Broome, Rationality Through Reason-
ing (op. cit.), p. 155. His modus ponens requirement includes as a third premise that I care whether
q; see Broome (ibid.), p. 157. His instrumental rationality and enkrasia requirements include the
additional premise that I believe that q is up to me; see Broome (ibid.), pp. 169, 171.
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• Modus ponens: believing p and if p then q implies believing q, formally
R = {C : (p, bel), (if p then q, bel) ∈ C)⇒ (q, bel) ∈ C}. Parameters: p, q ∈ L.
• Enkrasia (non-akrasia): believing obligatorily p implies intending p, formally
R = {C : (obligatorily p, bel) ∈ C ⇒ (p, int) ∈ C}. Parameter: p ∈ L.
• Instrumental rationality: intending p and believing q is a means implied
by p implies intending q, formally R = {C : (p, int), (q is a means implied by
p, bel) ∈ C ⇒ (q, int) ∈ C}. Parameters: p, q ∈ L.
If propositions have no formal structure, these definitions of requirements are informal,
since then we cannot give formal meaning to composite propositions such as not p, if
p then q and obligatorily p (where p, q ∈ L). But these definitions can, if wished, be
turned into formal definitions by adopting the syntactic (intensional) or set-theoretic
(extensional) model of propositions sketched above.31
Examples of requirements within Application 2:
R1: Transitivity. The transitivity schema consists of four subschemas, namely
transitivity of strict preference, transitivity of indifference, and two mixed trans-
itivities:
R1: Preferring x to y and y to z implies preferring x to z, formally R = {C :
if (x, y,), (y, z,) ∈ C then (x, z,) ∈ C}. Parameters: x, y, z ∈ X.
R1∼: Indifference between x and y and between y and z implies indifference
between x and z, formally R = {C : if (x, y,∼), (y, z,∼) ∈ C then (x, z,∼
) ∈ C}. Parameters: x, y, z ∈ X.
R1,∼: Preference of x to y and indifference between y and z imply preference
of x to z, formally R = {C : if (x, y,), (y, z,∼) ∈ C then (x, z,) ∈ C}.
Parameters: x, y, z ∈ X.
R1∼,: Indifference between x and y and preference of y to z imply preference
of x to z, formally R = {C : if (x, y,∼), (y, z,) ∈ C then (x, z,) ∈ C}.
Parameters: x, y, z ∈ X.
R2: Asymmetry of . Preferring x to y excludes preferring y to x, formally
R = {C : (x, y,) ∈ C ⇒ (y, x,) 6∈ C}. Parameters: x, y ∈ X.
R3: Symmetry of ∼. Indifference between x and y implies indifference between y
and x, formally R = {C : (x, y,∼) ∈ C ⇒ (y, x,∼) ∈ C}. Parameters: x, y ∈ X.
R4: Exclusiveness between  and ∼. Preference of x to y excludes indifference
between x and y, formally R = {C : (x, y,) ∈ C ⇒ (x, y,∼) 6∈ C}. Parameters:
x, y ∈ X.
R5: Preference completeness. The options x and y are compared, formally R =
{C : (x, y,) ∈ C or (y, x,) ∈ C or (x, y,∼) ∈ C}. Parameters: x, y ∈ X.
R6: No conflicting feasibility beliefs. You do not believe both Y and Y ′ to be
the feasible set, formally R = {C : (Y, bel) ∈ C ⇒ (Y ′, bel) 6∈ C}. Parameters:
distinct feasible sets Y, Y ′ ∈ 2X\{∅}.
R7: No conflicting intentions. You do not intend both x and y, formally R =
{C : (x, int) ∈ C ⇒ (y, int) 6∈ C}. Parameters: distinct options x, y ∈ X.
R8: Economic enkrasia. If you believe that Y is the feasible set and rank the
options in its subset Z top within Y then you intend some option in Z, formally
31For details, see Dietrich et al., “Beyond Belief”(op. cit.).
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R = {C : if (Y, bel) ∈ C, (x, y,) ∈ C for all x ∈ Z, y ∈ Y \Z, and (x, z,∼) ∈ C
for all distinct x, z ∈ Z, then (x, int) ∈ C for some x ∈ Z}. Parameters: Y ⊆ X
and Z ⊆ Y (Z 6= ∅).
In conjunction, R1-R8 are interpretable as representing the conventional theory of
rational choice under certainty, re-expressed mentalistically. To see this, suppose your
constitution satisfies the requirements R1-R8. Conditions R1-R5 ensure fully classical
preferences; our non-standard axiomatization R1-R5 comes from using two attitudes,
strict preference and indifference, rather than a single weak-preference attitude.32
Conditions R6-R7 exclude contradictory intentions or feasibility beliefs. Condition
R8 reflects the classical preference-maximization hypothesis: you intend something
that you most prefer among what you believe to be feasible. R8 also constitutes a
choice-theoretic counterpart of ordinary enkrasia (Application 1), which regulates the
formation of intentions. R8 differs from ordinary enkrasia in that intentions respond
to preferences, not ought-beliefs.
Notice a crucial consequence of working with intentions rather than (as choice
theory does) with choice acts: even if you rank more than one option top in your
feasible set (so that |Z| ≥ 2), you intend a specific option (from Z). Conventional
choice theory evades the question of how you manage to choose between top-ranked
options; see ‘Departure 3’in Section 2. We return to this issue in Section 7.33
As has become clear, requirements naturally come in schemas. One might therefore
have used the name ‘requirement’for sets (schemas) of sets R ⊆M , while calling each
member an ‘instance’of the requirement. This would have turned ‘our’requirements
into instances of requirements. Nothing hinges on our terminological choice.
Whether reasoning can achieve a requirement depends on the type of requirement.
Before we can show this, we first introduce our typology of requirements.
Definition 4 A consistency requirement is a requirement R that forbids holding
certain mental states simultaneously; formally, R = {C : not F ⊆ C} for some non-
empty set F of mental states, the ‘forbidden set’.
In Application 1, the non-contradiction requirement is a consistency requirement
(F = {(p, bel), (not p, bel)}). Application 2 contains consistency requirements in R2
(F = {(x, y,), (y, x,)}), R4 (F = {(x, y,), (x, y,∼)}), R6 (F = {(Y, bel), (Y ′, bel)}),
and R7 (F = {(x, int), (y, int)}). Our requirements R1-R4 imply preference acyclicity,
32See ‘Departure 1’in Section 2. R1 is our counterpart of classic choice-theoretic transitivity, which
requires for all x, y, z ∈ X that weak preference of x to y and of y to z implies weak preference of
x to z (formally R = {C : if [(x, y,) ∈ C or (x, y,∼) ∈ C] & [(y, z,) ∈ C or (y, z,∼) ∈ C] then
[(x, z,) ∈ C or (x, z,∼) ∈ C]}). R5 is our counterpart of classic choice-theoretic completeness, which
requires for all x, y ∈ X that x be weakly preferred to y or y to x (formally, R = {C : [(x, y,) ∈ C
or (x, y,∼) ∈ C] or [(y, x,) ∈ C or (y, x,∼) ∈ C]}). R2-R4 have no classic counterparts, as they
correspond to properties which the classic approach treats as true by definition (through the way it
defines strict preference and indifference from weak preferences). In fact, each of R1 and R5 implies
its classic counterpart, and is equivalent to it given R2-R4.
33Had we allowed coarse intentions (as discussed under ‘Departure 3’in Section 2), we could also
have stated a weaker version of R8, by replacing the intention of some element of Z by the intention
of some non-empty subset of Z.
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another schema of consistency requirements.34
Definition 5 A completeness requirement is a requirement R that forbids holding
none of certain mental states; formally, R = {C : C ∩ U 6= ∅} for some non-empty
set U , the ‘unavoidable set’.
Completeness requirements are non-abstention requirements. Examples are the
preference-completeness requirements in R5 (U = {(x, y,), (y, x,), (x, y,∼)}). In
Application 1 one might require ‘belief completeness’relative to certain propositions
p; here U = {(p, bel), (not p, bel)}.
Finally, a closedness requirement demands that holding certain (premise) states
implies holding a certain (conclusion) state:
Definition 6 A closedness requirement is a requirement R demanding that if cer-
tain mental states are held then a certain mental state is held; formally, R = {C :
P ⊆ C ⇒ c ∈ C} for some set of (‘premise’) states P and some (‘conclusion’) state c.
Modus ponens, enkrasia and instrumental rationality in Application 1 are schemas
of closedness requirements, as are transitivity R1 and symmetry of indifference R3 in
Application 2.
Our three types of requirement are mutually exclusive, except for one special case:
requirements of the form R = {C : m ∈ C} (‘you must hold statem’, for givenm ∈M)
are expressible both as degenerate completeness requirements R = {C : C ∩ {m} 6=
∅} and as degenerate closedness requirements R = {C : ∅ ⊆ C ⇒ m ∈ C}. All
requirements listed for Applications 1 and 2 fall under our typology, with the important
exception of economic enkrasia, which we address and ‘categorize’in Section 7.
4 Theories of rationality and their requirements
A theory of rationality expresses a specific conception of what rationality requires of
you. We now formalize the notion of ‘theory of rationality’, without attempting to
adjudicate between alternative theories. A brute-force approach to specifying a theory
would be to list all its requirements. But formally defining a ‘theory of rationality’as
a set of requirements would be both unparsimonious and too permissive.35 We thus
identify a theory, not with its set of requirements, but with the set of constitutions it
deems rational:
Definition 7 A notion or theory of rationality is a set T of constitutions; con-
stitutions in T are ‘rational’under T , others are ‘irrational’under T .
A theory of rationality is formally the same object as a requirement: it is a set of
constitutions. But that set is interpreted differently: it contains only the fully rational
34Preference acyclicity forbids a preference cycle over options x1, . . . , xn; so F = {(x1, x2,
), (x2, x3,), . . . , (xn−1, xn,), (xn, x1,)}. Parameters: n ≥ 2 and x1, ..., xn ∈ X.
35Unparsimonious : theories usually have enormously many requirements, most of which are artificial
(e.g., whenever R and R′ are requirements of the theory, so are their conjunction R∩R′ and disjunction
R ∪ R′). Too permissive : viewing any set of requirements as a theory allows for awkward theories,
since something can then be required without something logically weaker being required.
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constitutions, not all constitutions satisfying one particular requirement. A theory of
rationality implies certain requirements, representing the requirements of rationality
and defined as follows:
Definition 8 Given a theory of rationality T , the requirements of T are those
requirements R which follow from T , that is, for which T ⊆ R.
The strongest requirement of a theory T is the theory itself R = T ; the weakest is
the tautological requirement, i.e., the set R = 2M of all constitutions. Incidentally, a
theory T implies not just requirements, but also permissions. It might permit rather
than require transitive preferences.36
Our definitional setup has proceeded in a top-down direction, by starting with a
notion of rationality and deriving individual requirements. In practice, one proceeds
in a bottom-up direction: one first comes up with requirements of rationality, whose
conjunction then defines one’s theory of rationality. We have already argued that a
mentalistic version of the standard theory of rational choice under certainty can be
axiomatized by R1—R8. Formally, the intersection of those requirements defines a
theory of rationality T . Notice that exactly the same theory could be axiomatized
by a different set of requirements. For example, we might replace transitivity R1 by
Savage’s37 ‘negative transitivity’.38
5 Reasoning and becoming rational
Can you become rational through reasoning? This is Broome’s key question. We
now formalize the notions of ‘reasoning’ and ‘becoming rational’. There are many
pre-existing models of changes in beliefs or (more rarely) other attitudes; examples
are the ‘AGM theory’ of belief revision,39 non-Bayesian models of preference revi-
sion,40 and models of revising degrees of belief or desire.41 The machinery introduced
36T ‘permits’the constitution to be of a given kind (formally, to fall into a given set P of constitu-
tions) if some constitution in T is of that kind (formally, if P ∩ T 6= ∅).
37Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (op. cit.), pp. 17—21.
38Negative transitivity consists in the requirements R = {C : [(x, y,) 6∈ C&(y, z,) 6∈ C] ⇒
(x, z,) 6∈ C)} for all options x, y, z ∈ X. It is equivalent to transitivity R1, given R2-R5. Negative
transitivity requirements are requirements of a fourth type: they are ‘negative closedness’ require-
ments, given by R = {C : C ∩ P = ∅⇒ c 6∈ C} for certain P ⊆M and c ∈M .
39See Carlos E. Alchourrón, Peter Gärdenfors, and David Makinson, “On the Logic of Theory
Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, L, 2
(June 1985): 510—30; and Peter Gärdenfors, Knowledge in flux: Modeling the dynamics of epistemic
states (Cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1988).
40See Sven Ove Hansson, The Structure of Values and Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001); Till Grüne-Yanoff and Sven Ove Hansson (eds.), Preference Change: Approaches from
Philosophy, Economics and Psychology (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009); and Franz Dietrich and Christian
List, “A Model of Non-informational Preference Change,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, XXIII, 2
(April 2011): 145—64.
41See Richard Jeffrey, Contributions to the Theory of Inductive Probability (Princeton University,
1957); Franz Dietrich, Christian List, and Richard Bradley, “Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint
Characterization of Bayes’s and Jeffrey’s Rules,”Journal of Economic Theory, CLXII (March 2016):
352—71; and Richard Bradley, Decision Theory with a Human Face (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2017).
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here is tailored to Broome’s notion of revision, while taking inspiration from logic.
As explained in Section 1, reasoning for Broome is a conscious, rule-governed mental
process by which you form new attitudes based on existing ones. Broome focuses on
active reasoning: reasoning as an act, of which you are the agent. Active reasoning
is plausibly explicit, and hence expressed in language, whether loud or in our mind.42
A ‘reasoning rule’encodes this idea. For example, if you have the intention to swim
and the belief that swimming necessitates undressing, you might then reason that ‘So
I shall undress’ (where ‘shall’ is a linguistic marker of intention and ‘So’ expresses
the internal sense of rule-following). In terms of our model, you apply a rule to (cer-
tain attitudes in) your constitution, which adds a new attitude to your constitution.
Formally:
Definition 9 A reasoning rule is a pair r = (P, c) of a set of (premise) states
P ⊆M and a (conclusion) state c ∈M . The revision of a constitution C through
a rule r = (P, c) is the constitution C|r obtained by adding the conclusion state
provided all premise states are held, formally
C|r =
{
C ∪ {c} if P ⊆ C (the rule ‘applies’to C)
C if P 6⊆ C (the rule ‘does not apply’to C).
The rule in the swimming example is r = (P, c), where P contains (I swim, int)
and (swimming necessitates undressing, bel), and c is (I undress, int). This rule
naturally belongs to a schema (set) of rules: all rules which form an intention to
φ whenever one intends to ψ and believes that φ-ing requires ψ-ing, for some pair
of acts (φ, ψ). Just as requirements, rules typically come in schemas. So, like for
requirements, we might alternatively have defined a ‘rule’as a schema (set) of pairs
(P, r), where these pairs are the ‘instances’of the rule. This would turn rules into
instances of rules, and schemas of rules into rules. Our current terminology is more
convenient, though nothing hinges on it.
Rules in this Broomean sense are restrictive in two ways. First, they create rather
than remove attitudes; for instance, no rule removes the belief in a proposition p based
on the premise belief in not p. Second, premises of rules are attitudes rather than
absences of attitudes; for instance, no rule forms an intention based on the absence of
other intentions. Both principles follow from Broome’s explicit and conscious account
of reasoning.43 For instance, you can conclude through explicit reasoning that you
ought to give up your belief in p, but this adds an ought-belief rather than removing the
belief in p. This ought-belief may thereafter cause disappearance of the belief in p, but
no longer through explicit reasoning. Readers who prefer using the term ‘reasoning’
in a broader sense that covers mental processes other than explicit reasoning should
regard our Broomean model of reasoning as a model of explicit reasoning, and should
generally replace our term ‘reasoning’ by ‘explicit reasoning’. By contrast, many
existing accounts of revision do allow for removal of attitudes. For example, the ‘AGM
42Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (op. cit.), p. 267.
43Broome (ibid.), p. 278, explicitly denies that you can (correctly) reason towards absences. He
is less explicit about reasoning from absences, but it is fair to conclude that such reasoning is also
excluded by his account of reasoning. Kolodny, “Why Be Rational?”(op. cit.), pp. 527—8, in turn, is
explicit in rejecting reasoning from absences.
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theory’of belief revision asks which beliefs to give up in the face of information,44 and
Bradley’s theory of revision analyses the restriction or expansion of degrees of belief
or desire.45
Your way to reason is defined by the set of rules you follow, to be called your
‘reasoning system’.
Definition 10 A reasoning system is a set S of reasoning rules. A constitution C
is closed under S if for each rule r = (P, c) in S, possession of the premise states
implies possession of the conclusion state, that is, P ⊆ C ⇒ c ∈ C (equivalently,
C|r = C).
A reasoning system is our counterpart for multiple attitudes of a deductive system
for beliefs. If your constitution is not yet closed under your reasoning system S, then
reasoning leads to the addition (‘formation’) of new attitudes, until the constitution
is finally closed under S, that is, until each rule in S which applies has been applied.
We call the so-reached new constitution the ‘revision of C through S’:
Definition 11 The revision (or closure) of C through a reasoning system S
is the constitution C|S obtained from C by applying rules from S until the constitution
is closed under S. Formally, C|S is the minimal extension of C closed under S.46
Revision through a reasoning system is our counterpart of the familiar operation
of deductively closing your belief set, but it applies to your constitution (your full
‘psychology’) rather than just your beliefs. What is a ‘good’reasoning system, given
a theory of rationality? We postulate two criteria or desiderata:
• Desideratum 1: Reasoning should achieve many of the theory’s requirements of
rationality.
• Desideratum 2: Reasoning should never destroy the consistency of a constitu-
tion, a minimal demand defined shortly.
So, loosely speaking, reasoning should improve rationality by Desideratum 1,
without elsewhere compromising rationality by Desideratum 2. The following defini-
tion makes Desideratum 1 precise:
Definition 12 A reasoning system S achieves a requirement R if for each constitu-
tion C its revision C|S satisfies R.
The next two definitions clarify Desideratum 2:
Definition 13 Given a theory of rationality T , a constitution C is consistent if its
states can be rationally held together, that is, if some expanded constitution C ′ ⊇ C is
rational under T .
44Alchourrón et al., “On the Logic of Theory Change”(op. cit.).
45Bradley, Decision Theory with a Human Face (op. cit.).
46This minimal extension exists and is unique. It is the intersection of all extensions of C closed
under S.
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How does consistency of a constitution relate to our notion of consistency require-
ments? As one can show, a constitution is consistent if and only if it satisfies all
consistency requirements of the theory.47
Definition 14 Given a theory of rationality, a reasoning system S preserves con-
sistency if for each consistent constitution C its revision C|S is still consistent.
6 Achieving (or not achieving) rationality through reas-
oning
We are now in a position to provide answers to Broome’s question. Specifically, we
address three subquestions: can reasoning help you satisfy consistency requirements,
completeness requirements, and closedness requirements, respectively?
6.1 Can you achieve closedness requirements?
Fortunately, a general possibility result holds about closedness requirements:
Theorem 1 Given any theory of rationality T , there exists a reasoning system which
achieves each closedness requirement of T and preserves consistency.
So, whatever theory of rationality T we adopt, all its closedness requirements are
achievable through reasoning. For instance, you can achieve the transitivity require-
ments R1 in Application 2. The achievability of closedness requirements would be
trivial if we did not require consistency-preservation, since then you could use the
reasoning system S containing all rules: this would transform each constitution C
into the maximal constitution C|S = M , which trivially satisfies all closedness re-
quirements, but is inconsistent under any non-degenerate theory.
Typically, many alternative reasoning systems S achieve all closedness require-
ments of a given theory T (and preserve consistency). The theorem’s proof introduces
a tailor-made rule for each closedness requirement of T : S contains a rule (P, c)
whenever T makes the corresponding requirement R = {C : P ⊆ C ⇒ c ∈ C}. This
reasoning system is unnecessarily rich in rules and unrealistic for agents with limited
cognitive skills. It is also peculiar, as it achieves each closedness requirement of T
in a single reasoning step, by applying a tailor-made rule. Slimmer and psychologic-
ally more natural reasoning systems need more reasoning steps, but still achieve all
closedness requirements of T (and preserve consistency). This suggests a fundamental
trade-off: the richer the reasoning system is, the more rules the agent must internalize
or ‘store’, but the faster he can form some attitudes.
Theorem 1 formalizes the fundamental truth that reasoning, as understood by
Broome, is well adapted to achieving closedness requirements. Intuitively, this comes
from the structural analogy between reasoning rules and closedness requirements:
47First, assume C is inconsistent. Then no rational constitution includes C. So C is the forbidden
set of a consistency requirement of T . C violates this requirement. Conversely, if C violates some
consistency requirement of T , every extension C′ ⊇ C also violates it and is thus irrational, implying
inconsistency of C.
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closedness requirements have an if-then structure whose antecedent and consequent
are that certain attitudes are present, and reasoning is a process by which the presence
of certain attitudes causes the presence of another attitude.
6.2 Can you achieve consistency requirements?
The picture reverses as we consider consistency requirements:
Theorem 2 No reasoning system achieves any consistency requirement.
So reasoning can for instance not achieve requirements of non-contradictory beliefs
(Application 1), or of asymmetry of preference R2, no conflicting intentions R7, and
preference acyclicity (Application 2).
The proof is simple. Informally, if a constitution violates a consistency require-
ment, then that requirement is achievable only through removing certain attitudes.
Yet Broomean reasoning can only add, not remove attitudes.
Theorem 2’s negative result can be traced back to the impossibility to reason
towards absences of attitudes, a central Broomean thesis. To see why, notice that
a consistency requirement forbids simultaneously holding all attitudes from some set
F , which can be expressed as the if-then requirement that if certain F -states (all F -
states except a fixed one) are present then the remaining F -state is absent. One could
have achieved this requirement if one could reason from the presence of the former
states towards the absence of the latter state. Yet reasoning “cannot conclude in an
absence”, following Broome.
Broome offers a cautious defence of an apparently similar claim to Theorem 2:
through ‘correct reasoning’, you cannot achieve a requirement which forces you to give
up some attitude (a ‘consistency requirement’, in our terminology).48 Specifically, he
argues that if you hold beliefs in p and also in not p, then ‘correct reasoning’cannot
conclude in non-belief in p. You might derive from your belief in not p a positive belief
in I do not believe p, or in I ought not to believe p, but these beliefs crucially differ
from non-belief in p, and they come from ‘incorrect reasoning’, following Broome.
Theorem 2 says something simpler and more general: reasoning cannot achieve any
consistency requirements simpliciter, regardless of correctness considerations.
Broome argues that, where reasoning fails, “automatic processes will normally
prevent you from having contradictory beliefs”.49 We believe that reasoning can non-
etheless play a crucial role in achieving consistency requirements, that is, in removing
some attitude from a given set F of mutually inconsistent attitudes within your con-
stitution. We see three routes:
1. Reasoning might remove the grounds on which you hold or had formed some atti-
tude in F . In a second step, the ‘ground-less’attitude disappears automatically.
There might be many ways to remove the grounds of an attitude. One might be
to form the belief that you ought not to hold that attitude. Another might be
to form some attitude on whose absence that attitude used to be premised.
2. Plausibly, some attitudes in F are not hard-wired in your constitution. They
disappear after a while — they ‘expire’ or fail to be ‘refreshed’ — should the
48Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (op. cit.), pp. 278—80.
49Broome (ibid.), pp. 279—80.
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conditions for their survival no longer be met. In particular, some attitudes
(beliefs, intentions, preferences and so on) might ultimately disappear should
you develop certain other attitudes which conflict with them. Reasoning can
thus block the survival of attitudes through generating attitudes in conflict with
them. The belief that it rains might not be refreshed if you meanwhile form a
belief in sunshine.
3. Psychologists often assume that your attitudes are of two sorts, ‘explicit’and
‘implicit’ ones.50 Implicit attitudes might be described as unconscious, never
actively formed, or the result of automatic processes or ‘System 1’. Explicit at-
titudes might be described as conscious, actively formed, or the result of explicit
reasoning or ‘System 2’. Explicit attitudes can sometimes crowd out implicit at-
titudes if there is some direct conflict between the two.51 By producing explicit
attitudes, reasoning can thus make some implicit attitudes disappear, thereby
restoring consistency. For example, suppose you hold inconsistent beliefs. By
reasoning you come to believe a proposition p, which directly conflicts with your
existing belief of not p. Your explicit belief of p then makes your (supposedly
implicit) belief of not p disappear.
6.3 Can you achieve completeness requirements?
Consider a completeness requirement: you should hold at least one mental state
from U , formally R = {C : C ∩ U 6= ∅}. There is an easy (but, as will turn
out, unsatisfactory) way to achieve R: fix an attitude c ∈ U , and adopt the rule
to ‘always form attitude c’, formally the rule r = (∅, c) with an empty premise
set. For example, let T be the theory of rationality defined by R1—R8 in Applica-
tion 2, and consider the preference-completeness requirement in R5 for options x, y,
formally R∗ = {C : (x, y,) ∈ C or (y, x,) ∈ C or (x, y,∼) ∈ C}. Any of the
rules r1 = (∅, (x, y,)) (‘always come to prefer x to y’), r2 = (∅, (y, x,)) (‘always
come to prefer y to x’) or r3 = (∅, (x, y,∼)) (‘always become indifferent between x
and y’) would achieve that requirement R∗. But this solution is unsatisfactory for
two reasons. Firstly, in many contexts, such arbitrary rules seem unjustified: why
for example should one systematically come to prefer x to y in the name of prefer-
ence completeness? But there is a second problem: while achieving a completeness
requirement, such a rule often causes violation of a consistency requirement. Sup-
pose you initially have no preference or indifference between x and y, violating R∗,
but you prefer y to another option z, and z to x. So your initial constitution is
C = {(y, z,), (z, x,), . . .}, where ‘...’stands for other states. As in the putative
solution, let your reasoning system S contain the rule r1, so that after reasoning the
revised constitution is C|S = {(x, y,), (y, z,), (z, x,), . . .}. While C|S satisfies
the completeness requirement R∗, it violates a preference-acyclicity requirement of
the theory (defined in footnote 34). A completeness requirement has been achieved at
the cost of a consistency requirement. The rules r2 and r3 lead to analogous problems.
In general, when can a rule of type (∅,m) cause a consistency violation? To answer
50See, for example, Timothy D. Wilson, Samuel Lindsey, and Tonya Y. Schooler, “A Model of Dual
Attitudes,”Psychological review, CVII, 1 (January 2000): 101—26.
51See Wilson et al. (ibid.), p. 102.
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this question, we need the concept of falsifiability:
Definition 15 Given any theory of rationality T , a mental state m is falsifiable if
some consistent constitution becomes inconsistent through adding m.
In plausible theories of rationality, almost all states are falsifiable. For example,
(p, bel) in Application 1 is falsifiable because it rules out (not p, bel); and (x, y,)
in Application 2 is falsifiable because it rules out (y, x,), and (x, y,∼), and the
combination of (y, z,) and (z, x,), and so on.
Our general result about completeness requirements states as follows:
Theorem 3 Given any theory of rationality T ,
(a) some reasoning system achieves all completeness requirements of T , but
(b) no consistency-preserving reasoning system achieves any completeness require-
ment of T whose U -states are all falsifiable.
The negative result (b) can be traced back to the impossibility to (explicitly) reason
from absences of attitudes towards attitudes; see footnote 43. Reasoning from absences
would have helped us achieve completeness requirements because such requirements
are expressible as if-then requirements where the antecedent is the absence of certain
states (all but one of the U -states) and the consequent is the presence of an attitude
(the remaining U -state). In sum, the diffi culty to achieve consistency requirements
(Theorem 2) and completeness requirements (Theorem 3(b)) stems from the Broomean
impossibility to reason towards absences and from absences, respectively.
Why does our negative finding in (b) not contradict our positive finding in Theorem
1 about closedness requirements, although certain degenerate completeness require-
ments (those with a single U -state) are also special closedness requirements? Part (b)
rules out such degenerate completeness requirements because their single U -state is
non-falsifiable, as one easily checks.
Although completeness requirements share with consistency requirements the un-
achievability through reasoning, completeness requirements seem even less under your
conscious control. In terms of the dual-system model, the conscious reasoning of Sys-
tem 2 operates on inputs generated by the unconscious processes of System 1. If these
inputs are insuffi cient to allow conscious reasoning to arrive at particular types of
conclusion, this does not seem to be a fault of reasoning —nor, one might think, a
contravention of rationality. Take the case of the preference completeness requirement
of choice theory. If, given the preferences and beliefs you actually hold, there is no
way of reasoning towards any specific preference or indifference between options x and
y, one might doubt that that rationality requires you to hold some such preference
or indifference, while being silent about which.52 However, banishing completeness
requirements altogether from theories of rationality may go too far. As we now ar-
gue, certain completeness-like requirements have a strong claim to count as rationality
requirements.
52Hausman, Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare (op. cit.), p. 19. It is sometimes claimed that,
if your preferences are not complete and transitive, you are necessarily vulnerable to ‘money pumps’.
This is incorrect: see especially Robin Cubitt and Robert Sugden, “On Money Pumps,”Games and
Economic Behavior, XXXVII, 1 (October 2001): 121—60.
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7 Economic enkrasia and Buridan’s ass
The economic enkrasia requirement in R8 is neither a closedness requirement, nor a
consistency requirement, nor a completeness requirement. Whether it is achievable
through reasoning is thus not settled by Theorems 1-3. This question is however
crucial for forming intentions and making choices. To address it, consider the famous
problem of Buridan’s ass.
In the story, the ass is exactly equidistant from two identical bales of hay, one to
its right and one to its left. Unable to decide between the two, it starves to death.
Representing this situation in Application 2 of our model, let the ass face the feasible
set Y = {left, right, starve}, and have the initial constitution C = {(left, right,∼
), (left, starve,), (right, starve,), (Y, bel)}. In our interpretation, the ass fails to
form an intention for left or right, which leads to the outcome starve, the only feasible
outcome requiring no intention.
Could the ass have solved its problem by reasoning? Broome argues that the an-
swer is ‘Yes’.53 His solution is strikingly simple: in our terminology, the ass’s reasoning
system can contain both of the rules r1 = (C, (left, int)) and r2 = (C, (right, int));
and (something we do not engage with) both rules are correct. According to Broome,
“there is room for choice in reasoning”, and so the ass is free to choose which of the
two rules to apply.54 Having chosen one, it gets to a bale of hay and survives.
Viewed through our model, this solution is problematic, because there is nothing
in the domain of reasoning to stop the ass from forming both intentions and, if this
happens, reasoning cannot ex-post eliminate one of them. Psychologically, conflicting
intentions might have much the same unfortunate effects as the absence of intentions.
In having no intention, the ass effectively violates economic enkrasia R8. Economic
enkrasia requirements are completeness requirements of the following generalized type:
Definition 16 A conditional-completeness requirement is a requirement R whereby
possession of certain (premise) states implies possession of at least one of certain pos-
sible (conclusion) states; formally, R = {C : P ⊆ C ⇒ C ∩ U 6= ∅} for some sets of
states P and U 6= ∅.
Conditional-completeness requirements indeed generalize completeness require-
ments, obtained when P = ∅. Are conditional-completeness requirements achievable
through reasoning? Theorem 3 generalizes as follows.
Definition 17 Given any theory of rationality T and any set P ⊆M of mental states,
a mental state m ∈M\P is falsifiable given P if some consistent constitution that
includes P becomes inconsistent through adding m.
Theorem 4 Given any theory of rationality T ,
(a) some reasoning system achieves all conditional-completeness requirements of T ,
but
(b) no consistency-preserving reasoning system achieves any conditional-completeness
requirement whose U -states are all falsifiable given P .
53Broome, Rationality Through Reasoning (op. cit.), pp. 189—90, 263—4.
54Broome (ibid.), p. 264.
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Illustrating part (a), if the ass’s reasoning system contains either (or both) of the
rules r1 and r2, the ass can form an intention to go to one bale of hay, thereby achieving
the economic enkrasia requirement. But this leads to conflicting intentions whenever
(against the story) another intention was already present —which illustrates part (b).
Could different reasoning rules solve this problem? Generalizing the notion of
‘rule’, might one replace r1 and r2 with a single ‘rule’that derives (right, int) from
the presence of the states in C and the absence of (left, int)? But that would be
reasoning from an absence, which is un-Broomean. Or (making the strong assumption
of negative introspection), one might assume that whenever the ass lacks an intention
it believes that it lacks it, and then replace r1 and r2 with a single rule that derives
(right, int) from the union of C and {(no option is currently intended, bel)}. But that
would require second-order reasoning, which seems contrary to the spirit of Broome’s
approach, although compatible with our Broomean notion of a ‘rule’.
Perhaps the most Broomean response to the problem would be to keep r1 and
r2 and to argue that automatic processes will induce consistency by eliminating ‘sur-
plus’intentions. That at least would have the virtue of offering a unified solution to
the diffi culty to achieve requirements of consistency, completeness, and conditional
completeness: automatic causal processes jump in where reasoning fails.
8 Concluding assessment
The concept of rational choice is often formulated in terms of rationality axioms on
preferences and beliefs, but theorists usually neglect to describe the reasoning process
by which these rational attitudes come into existence. This paper has developed
a formal framework, inspired by Broome’s sharp distinction between the notions of
reasoning and rationality, to answer the central question of whether reasoning can
make us more rational.
In the introduction, we argued that a negative answer to this question would
pose serious problems for rational choice theory and for those theories in behavioural
social science that explain anomalous choices as resulting from reasoning error. Hav-
ing broken down this general question into specific questions about different types
of rationality requirement, we have arrived at one positive answer (with respect to
closedness requirements) and two negative ones (with respect to completeness and
consistency requirements). We must therefore conclude that rational choice theory
and behavioural social science do face a serious problem. This conclusion however
hinges on accepting Broome’s account of reasoning. If, by contrast, we take the un-
Broomean view that reasoning can start from, or generate, absences of attitudes, then
the diffi culty to become rational disappears: reasoners can then achieve consistency re-
quirements and completeness requirements, over and above closedness requirements.
An intermediate view is that there are different kinds of reasoning, and that con-
scious, explicit reasoning cannot handle absences whereas certain subconscious or
implicit forms of reasoning can. Then we are still left with a semi-negative conclusion:
reasoners can only become rational by engaging into subconscious or implicit forms
of reasoning. So to say, becoming rational requires giving up conscious control over
one’s mind —still a remarkable conclusion.
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Our negative result about completeness requirements is clearly significant in rela-
tion to the requirement of complete preferences, a standard axiom in received forms of
choice theory. One possible response —a position taken by Hausman55 —would be to
give up preference completeness as a requirement of rationality. Clearly, that would
call for major revisions to choice theory. Such revisions might allow us to understand
context-dependent choice as evidence, not of error, but of preference incompleteness.
It might be argued that, when an individual has to choose between two options but
lacks any preference or indifference between them, it is not irrational for her to rely on
automatic processes to form an intention to choose one of them, even when those pro-
cesses are context-dependent, as argued by Infante et al.56 Accepting that conclusion
would undermine many claims about ‘reasoning error’made by behavioural scientists.
Aside from preference completeness, some completeness-like requirements do seem to
be natural requirements of rationality, as we pointed out in our discussion of Buridan’s
ass. It is therefore questionable whether a plausible theory of rational choice could be
entirely free of completeness (or completeness-like) requirements, hence whether the
diffi culty could be entirely avoided.
Our negative result about consistency requirements reveals a more fundamental
problem. It is uncontroversial that many consistency requirements are requirements
of rationality. In many cases, there exist (un-Broomean) accounts of reasoning —for
example, those represented in theories of belief revision — that tell you to remove
attitudes where your attitudes are mutually inconsistent (sometimes leaving you some
freedom as to which attitudes to remove, a potential problem we shall set aside here).
Although our Broomean model does not allow removing an attitude, it allows adding
the belief that you ought to remove a given attitude, e.g., to remove a belief, preference,
or intention which conflicts with your other beliefs, preferences, or intentions. The
problem is that this is second-order reasoning. It creates a second-order belief that
you ought to remove a first-order attitude, rather than extinguishing that first-order
attitude. As Broome points out, we lack an account of how such an ought belief
can lead to actual removal of the relevant attitude through conscious reasoning. We
have however suggested some possible accounts of how an individual might be able
to achieve consistency requirements with the help of reasoning. These accounts rely
not on reasoning alone, but on an interplay of reasoning and other mental processes.
These other processes are fundamentally different: they are causal processes outside
our conscious control, and cannot qualify as mental ‘acts’ in any substantive sense
of agency. Calling these processes ‘subconscious reasoning’ (as proponents of the
‘intermediate view’sketched above might do) would stretch the notion of reasoning
and would risk trivialising this notion by counting any process of mental change as
‘reasoning’.
If formal rationality can be characterised as order in the mind —and, like Broome,
we think it can — then a convincing understanding of this form of order needs an
account of how human minds can create order in themselves. Our tentative conclusion
is that such an account requires an analysis of how reasoning interacts with other
mental operations, not all of which are under conscious control.
55Hausman, Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare (op. cit.), pp. 19—20.
56 Infante et al., “Preference Purification and the Inner Rational Agent”(op. cit.).
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A A general type of requirement
All types of requirements considered above are special cases of a single type, namely a
generalized version of conditional-completeness requirements which no longer imposes
that U 6= ∅:
Definition 18 A unified requirement is a requirement R whereby possession of
certain (premise) states implies possession of at least one of certain possible (conclu-
sion) states; formally, R = {C : P ⊆ C ⇒ C ∩ U 6= ∅} for some sets of states P and
U , not both empty.
Unified requirements are unificatory in two senses. Firstly, they simultaneously
generalize our three earlier requirement classes:
Remark 1 Unified requirements R = {C : P ⊆ C ⇒ C ∩ U 6= ∅} reduce to
• completeness requirements if P = ∅, as then R = {C : C ∩ U 6= ∅},
• consistency requirements if U = ∅, as then R = {C : not P ⊆ C},
• closedness requirements if U is a singleton {c}, as then R = {C : P ⊆ C ⇒ c ∈
C}.57
Secondly, every theory can be axiomatized in terms of unified requirements only:
Theorem 5 Every theory of rationality T is an intersection (conjunction) of unified
requirements.
Given the generality of unified requirements, it is natural to ask how far they are
achievable through reasoning. Our earlier theorems provide the answer. If U = ∅,
our negative conclusion about consistency requirements applies (Theorem 2). If U
is singleton, our positive conclusion about closedness requirements applies (Theorem
1). Otherwise our essentially negative conclusion about completeness or conditional-
completeness requirements applies (Theorems 3 and 4).
B Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Let T be a theory. Define the reasoning system S as con-
taining all rules corresponding to closedness requirements of T . So S = {(P, c) : the
closedness requirement given by (P, c) is a requirement of T}. Now consider any initial
constitution C and any closedness requirement R of T , given by a pair (P, c).
Claim 1: C|S satisfies the requirement R. This is true because if P ⊆ C|S, then
c ∈ C|S as C|S is closed under S which contains (P, c).
Claim 2 : S preserves consistency. Assume C is consistent, hence a subset of a
rational constitution C∗ ∈ T . We show that C|S ⊆ C∗ (which establishes consistency).
This follows from two facts. The first is that C∗ is closed under S, because it is rational
57Furthermore, unified requirements reduce to negative-closedness requirements (defined in footnote
38), which are obtained if P is a singleton {c} as then R = {C : c ∈ C ⇒ C ∩U 6= ∅} or equivalently
R = {C : C ∩ U = ∅⇒ c 6∈ C}.
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and hence in particular satisfies all closedness requirements of T . The second is that
C|S is by definition the smallest extension of C closed under S. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a reasoning system S, and a consistency requirement
R, say R = {C : not F ⊆ C}. It suffi ces to specify a constitution C such that C|S
violates R. Simply let C be any constitution such that F ⊆ C. Since F ⊆ C and
C ⊆ C|S, we have F ⊆ C|S. So the revised constitution C|S violates R. 
Proof of Theorems 3 and 4. Since Theorem 3 is the special case of Theorem 4 in
which P = ∅, it suffi ces to prove Theorem 4. Consider any theory T .
(a) By definition, each conditional-completeness requirement of T is conditional
on some set P of states, and has at least one U -state. For each such requirement, fix
an arbitrary member mU of U , and define the rule rU = (P,mU ). Let S be any reas-
oning system containing one such rule for each conditional-completeness requirement.
Clearly, S achieves all conditional-completeness requirements of T .
(b) Consider any conditional-completeness requirement of T , defined by some P
and U (where U 6= ∅). Suppose some consistency-preserving reasoning system S
achieves this requirement. Since the requirement is achieved, there must be some
m′ ∈ U such that m′ ∈ P |S. To complete the proof, it suffi ces to show that m′ is
not falsifiable given P . To that end, we consider a consistent C ′ ⊇ P , and must show
consistency of C ′∪{m′}. Because S is consistency-preserving, C ′|S is consistent. But
m′ ∈ P |S and P ⊆ C ′ imply m′ ∈ C ′|S. As C ′|S (= (C ′|S) ∪ {m′}) is consistent, so
is its subset C ′ ∪ {m′}. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider a theory T . For any constitution C 6∈ T , T makes the
requirement not to have that constitution, that is, the ‘unique-exclusion’requirement
RC = {C ′ : C ′ 6= C}. The theory is expressible as the conjunction (intersection) of its
unique-exclusion requirements: T = ∩C⊆M :C 6∈TRC . Each RC is a unified requirement,
as it equivalently demands that possession of all states in C implies possession of at
least one state not in C, formally RC = {C ′ : C ⊆ C ′ ⇒ C ′ ∩ (M ∩ C) 6= ∅}. 
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